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WHY PATENTEES LITIGATE 
 
Damon C. Andrews1
Several aspects of patent litigation call into question patent 
holders’ motivation for enforcing their exclusionary rights. Indeed, the 
expense alone can be enough to deter a firm from engaging in litigation, 
especially if it is likely that the parties will be unable to reach a settlement 
agreement and will go to trial. Notwithstanding, the number of patent 
infringement filings in district courts grows each year, thus providing a 
forum for asking what patent holders really desire to gain from litigating. 
Although injunctive relief and damages awards confer benefits to patent 
holders that can make litigating worthwhile, this Article posits that 
plaintiffs have no intention of ever obtaining these statutory remedies. 
Rather, handsome settlement arrangements provide the incentive for 
patentees to litigate. This Article contends that such settlement agreements 
are becoming a way of life for patent holders, and that rather than viewing 
litigation as an end result of parties’ failure to resolve a dispute, it is 
instead becoming the ordinary course of business and a routine 
consequence of owning a patent.  
 
                                                 
1  J.D., University of Iowa College of Law, 2011; B.S., Clemson University, 2008. This 
Article was awarded an Inaugural Samsung–Stanford Patent Prize and was presented at the 
Samsung–Stanford Patent Remedies Conference at Stanford Law School in February 2011. I 
thank participants of the Conference for their insightful feedback and suggestions, especially 
Colleen Chien. I also thank Jeff Karmilovich for his longstanding friendship, guidance, and 
advice over the years. 
Vol. XII The Columbia Science and Technology Law Review  2011 
 
220 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
“I have heard trial judges claim that they dislike patent litigation, partly 
because it is hard. Patent litigation is like the neurosurgery of litigation: it 
is hard scientifically and it is hard legally.” 




Patent litigation is complex.3  Infringement suits charge judges and juries with the 
task of analyzing arguably the most intricate factual issues presented in federal courts 
today.4  Moreover, courts must grapple with patent law’s highly esoteric legal doctrines 
and apply those principles to the underlying technologies at issue.5  These complexities 
have generated debate among scholars as to whether the district courts should even hear 
patent cases,6 and if so, whether juries are competent to render fair and rational verdicts.7
                                                 
2  Symposium, A Panel Discussion: Claim Construction from the Perspective of the District 
Judge, 54 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 671, 682 (2004). 
  
Indeed, despite the efforts to unify patent law with the creation of the Federal Circuit, 
3  E.g., Rohm & Haas Co. v. Brotech Corp., 127 F.3d 1089, 1092 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (Rader, 
J.) (“Patent litigation frequently is complex, long, and difficult.”). 
4  See Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Does Geographic Choice 
Affect Innovation?, 79 N.C. L. Rev. 889, 933 (2001) (“[Patent suits] are among the most complex 
cases on [district courts’] dockets.”). 
5  Jonathan L. Moore, Particularizing Patent Pleading: Pleading Patent Infringement in a 
Post-Twombly World, 18 Tex. Intell. Prop. L.J. 451, 460–61 (2010); see Cybor Corp. v. FAS 
Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1479 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (Newman, J., offering additional views) 
(“When the issues in litigation involve complex questions of science and technology, a special 
effort is required of the judicial process.”). 
6  See generally Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped to Resolve Patent 
Cases?, 15 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 1, 3 (2001) (calling into question district court judges’ ability to, 
inter alia, properly construe patent claims). 
7  Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases—An Empirical Peak Inside the 
Black Box, 99 Mich. L. Rev. 365, 365 & n.2 (2000) (“[T]here is a popular perception that the 
increasing complexity of technology being patented . . . has made patent trials extremely difficult 
for lay juries to understand.”); see also Michael A. Fisher, Going for the Blue Ribbon: The 
Legality of Expert Juries in Patent Litigation, 2 Colum. Sci. & Tech. L. Rev. 1, 1 (2001) (“As 
patented technologies have become increasingly complex, there has been growing concern that 
ordinary jurors lack the ability to understand the scientific and technical issues in patent litigation. 
Although a court may call upon expert witnesses, special masters, and other means of facilitating 
comprehension, there are likely to be many patent-related cases in which the issues are so far 
beyond the training and intelligence of the jury that no rational fact-finding is possible.”). 
Vol. XII The Columbia Science and Technology Law Review  2011 
 
221 
unpredictable results and inconsistent damages awards still plague patentees at the trial-
court level.8  Additionally, the pedantic issues that pervade patent cases often result in 
lengthy trials that can endure for weeks.9  This protracted timetable for adjudication is 
further exacerbated by the fact that patent cases are often delayed due to heavy criminal 
dockets in the district courts.10
These features of infringement lawsuits yield the undeniable conclusion that 
patent litigation is expensive.
   
11  For example, a 2009 survey found that the median total 
cost of an infringement lawsuit where between $1 million and $25 million was at stake 
was $2.5 million.12  This figure more than doubled where the potential recovery was 
greater than $25 million.13  Even as early as the mid-1980s, parties were combining to 
spend upwards of several hundred million dollars to litigate patent-infringement suits.14
                                                 
8  Moore, supra note 3, at 891–94 (“[D]espite the creation of the Federal Circuit, choice of 
forum continues to play a critical role in the outcome of patent litigation. . . . The lack of 
uniformity in patent enforcement is problematic in and of itself.”). 
   
9  James F. Holderman & Halley Guren, The Patent Litigation Predicament in the United 
States, 2007 U. Ill. J.L. Tech. & Pol’y 1, 10 (“Pretrial discovery in a patent case typically takes 
several months and sometimes years.”). 
10  Kevin R. Casey, Alternate Dispute Resolution and Patent Law, 3 Fed. Cir. B.J. 1, 4 
(1993) (“The United States federal district courts are so overloaded with criminal cases that their 
major civil cases, especially patent cases, suffer delay. It may take years to try a patent case.”); 
Gregg A. Paradise, Arbitration of Patent Infringement Disputes: Encouraging the Use of 
Arbitration Through Evidence Rules Reform, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 247, 251–53 (1995) (“[T]he 
federal district courts’ civil dockets are very overcrowded. . . . Courts do not have the time to hear 
lengthy patent cases which typically take several weeks to litigate. Thus, patent cases often lie 
dormant for many months or years.”). 
11  See, e.g., Jay P. Kesan & Gwendolyn G. Ball, How Are Patent Cases Resolved? An 
Empirical Examination of the Adjudication and Settlement of Patent Disputes, 84 Wash. U. L. 
Rev. 237, 312 (2006) (“[T]he transaction costs associated with patent litigation loom large . . . .”); 
Jay P. Kesan & Andres A. Gallo, Why “Bad” Patents Survive in the Market and How Should We 
Change?—The Private and Social Costs of Patents, 55 Emory L.J. 61, 68–69 (2006) (“[F]irms 
and individuals do try to avoid or minimize the extent of patent litigation, since the associated 
costs are very high.”). 
12  Am. Intellectual Prop. Law Ass’n, Report of Economic Survey 2009, at 29 (2009) 
[hereinafter AIPLA Report 2009]. 
13  Id. (median total cost of $5.5 million). 
14  Casey, supra note 9, at 4 n.13. The parties in Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 789 
F.2d 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1986), spent a total of almost $200 million on the lawsuit. Id. (citation 
omitted). 
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When evaluated holistically, the high litigation costs and uncertainty of recovery 
thus raise the question of why patentees involve themselves in such expensive lawsuits,15 
and when they do, what they really desire to gain. As several prominent scholars have 
noted, “[p]arties arguing over a patent worth $1 million in damages may have little 
incentive to litigate their claim[] because the cost of litigation will eat up much of the 
surplus.” 16   This Article endeavors to explore the real reason underlying patentees’ 
incentives to litigate. It does so by evaluating the nature of the patent-driven technology 
industry and by comparing the value of high-dollar settlement agreements with that of 
permanent injunctions and monetary damages awards. In short, I argue that what 
patentees really desire from infringement lawsuits are handsome settlements—i.e., large, 
up-front payouts or licensing agreements, often enhanced by the threat that the court will 
find willful infringement—not the traditional remedies of long-term injunctions or 
unpredictable damages awards. While several scholars have advanced the theory that 
parties are prone to settle disputes in the interest of avoiding costly trials,17
Part II of this Article examines the reasons that patentees may not want to assert 
their exclusionary rights in litigation. First, Part II.A contemplates that patentees may 
face significant challenges even getting their infringement claims past the dismissal phase 
of a lawsuit in light of the Supreme Court’s Twombly–Iqbal plausibility standard. Next, 
Part II.B analyzes the high costs of litigation and the substantial time investments that are 
typical of infringement lawsuits should the patentee successfully plead the elements of an 
infringement claim, and Part II.C contemplates the harms than can emerge from the 
litigation itself. Part III of this Article evaluates remedies for patentees. Part III.A 
analyzes injunctive relief. Part III.B then surveys monetary relief as a remedy for 
patentees. Part III.C then evaluates settlement agreements as a form of “remedy” for 
patent owners. Finally, in Part IV.A of the Article, I argue that as a general matter, the 
inherent drawbacks of infringement lawsuits yield the conclusion that the reason 
 the intricate 
issues that are inherent to patent litigation provide a platform for discussing why 
patentees are especially willing to settle to avoid additional harms other than just the 
expense of litigating. This Article examines why patent litigation is particularly tailored 
to fit this model, and is grounded on the following principal theories: first, patent 
litigation is, indeed, very costly; second, patent disputes do not fit the Priest–Klein 
framework for civil litigation; and third, litigation-for-settlement has emerged as a way of 
doing business for many companies. 
                                                 
15  In fact, studies show that many patentees choose not to assert their rights in court. See 
Mark A. Lemley, Essay, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1495, 1501 
(2001) (presenting statistics that of the roughly two million patents in force, only about 1600 new 
infringement lawsuits were filed per year between 1995 and 1999). 
16  John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley, Kimberly A. Moore & R. Derek Trunkey, Valuable 
Patents, 92 Geo. L.J. 435, 442 (2004). 
17  See, e .g., Leandra Lederman, Precedent Lost: Why Encourage Settlement, and Why 
Permit Non-Party Involvement in Settlements?, 75 Notre Dame L. Rev. 221, 225–26 & n.31 
(1999) (“In a nutshell, the reason so many cases settle is because the alternative to settlement is 
litigation, which is generally quite costly.”). 
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patentees litigate is for high-dollar settlement agreements. This is not to say, however, 
that injunctions are not valuable or that damages awards are never worth the expense and 
time of a trial. Indeed, there are many instances where courts find the infringement to be 
of a nature such that damages are higher than the amount for which a settlement could 
have been negotiated, especially if the court finds willful infringement. Part V.B then 
considers several proposals to reform the system of patent litigation to avoid, or at least 
diminish to an extent, the previously discussed complexities and drawbacks of litigation. 
In summary, this Article does not posit that the traditional patent remedies are per 
se inadequate; rather, this Article advances the theory that the statutory remedies offered 
by the Patent Act might not always be the most desirable given the several time-
consuming and expensive challenges that patentees face at trial. Moreover, this Article 
advances the theory that litigation-for-settlement among patent owners is merely a way of 
life and is “business as usual” for those firms with robust patent portfolios, and that for 
those firms without substantial patent portfolios, litigation-for-settlement is a way to 
survive in the marketplace and is in fact an emerging business model. 
II.  THE DISINCENTIVES OF PATENT LITIGATION 
Patent prosecution is not for those with shallow pockets. Depending on the 
complexity of the subject matter, some firms spend upwards of $30,000 to obtain a single 
patent.18 Because such a large amount of capital is invested to procure patents,19 it would 
seem to logically follow that firms would likewise vigorously protect these rights through 
litigation. However, this is not always the case. Indeed, a study by Professor Lemley 
revealed that less than two tenths of one percent of all patents ever issued actually found 
their way into courtrooms.20 Although filings for patent lawsuits have shown a steady rise 
over the last two decades,21 unenforced patent infringement is nevertheless widespread.22
                                                 
18  Lemley, supra note 14, at 1498; see also Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, 
Patent Portfolios, 154 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 4 n.3 (2005) (reporting the average patent to be valued 
between $7500 and $25,000, and noting that this figure “is generally less than average acquisition 
costs”). 
 
19  Lemley, supra note 14, at 1499 (estimating a total annual expenditure of $4.33 billion on 
patent prosecution). 
20  Id. at 1501 (“About 1,600 patent lawsuits are filed each year. . . . Only about one hundred 
cases per year (and 125 patents) actually make it to trial.”). 
21  Jason Rantanen, Patent Suit Filings for 2010 Show a Slight Rise, Patently-O Blog, Jan. 
28, 2011, http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2011/01/patent-suit-filings-for-2010-show-a-slight-
raise.html.  
22  See Dan L. Burk, Patenting Speech, 79 Tex. L. Rev. 99, 148 (2000) (“[P]olicing 
prohibited uses of patented inventions is notoriously difficult. . . . [P]rocess infringement occurs 
behind the scenes, in use or production of the unpatented materials, and it is not always possible 
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The fact that patent owners are not enforcing these instances of infringement reveals—or 
at the least, indicates—that they harbor anxiety when it comes to litigating. These 
reservations can be rooted in both legal and economic concerns surrounding a patent 
lawsuit. The following subparts detail several reasons that patent owners might be 
deterred from asserting their rights against an infringer in litigation. 
A.  Overcoming the (Heightened) Pleading Requirement 
Patent infringement lawsuits are no different than any type other civil action.23 To 
that end, plaintiffs’ complaints for patent infringement must satisfy the minimum level of 
specificity for pleading in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a).24 Two 
recent Supreme Court decisions—Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly 25  and Ashcroft v. 
Iqbal26—have arguably reshaped the landscape for pleading in the past few years to the 
detriment of plaintiffs. In Twombly, the Court dismissed a complaint under Section 2(a) 
of the Sherman Act, reasoning that the plaintiffs’ complaint did not “nudge[] their claims 
across the line from conceivable to plausible.” 27  This standard appeared markedly 
different from the longstanding “no set of facts” construction of Rule 8(a) set forth in 
Conley v. Gibson28 that emerged fifty years earlier and that had formed the foundation for 
modern pleading under the Federal Rules.29
                                                                                                                                                 
to tell whether the materials were made via the patented process or via some other public domain 
process.”). 
 For nearly two years following Twombly, 
circuit courts were split as to what extent the Court’s plausibility language in Twombly 
changed standard for notice pleading, and if it did, whether the new standard applied to 
23  35 U.S.C. § 281 (2006) (“A patentee shall have remedy by civil action for infringement 
of his patent.”); Moore, supra note 4, at 479 (“A patent infringement suit is merely a specific type 
of civil action.”). 
24  Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (requiring a pleading to contain “a short and plain statement of the 
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”). 
25  550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
26  129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). 
27  Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. 
28  355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957) (“[A] complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a 
claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his 
claim which would entitle him to relief.”). 
29  A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. Rev. 431, 431 (2008) (“[U]ntil 
recently [Conley v. Gibson] was the bedrock case undergirding the idea that ours is a system of 
notice pleading in which detailed facts need not be pleaded.”). 
Vol. XII The Columbia Science and Technology Law Review  2011 
 
225 
only antitrust claims.30 Iqbal subsequently resolved this confusion and clarified that the 
Twombly threshold applies to all civil actions.31 Reflecting on these cases, commentators 
have concluded that Twombly and Iqbal significantly altered the criteria for what 
plaintiffs must plead to advance to the discovery phase of a civil lawsuit.32
While a heightened pleading standard is troublesome for complainants in all types 
of civil actions,
  
33 the new formulation for pleading presents several particular hindrances 
for plaintiffs in the patent infringement context. For instance, since Twombly–Iqbal, 
several district courts have imposed the requirement that plaintiffs specifically plead how 
the defendant infringed the asserted patent.34
                                                 
30  Compare Davis v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. Consol., 516 F.3d 955, 974 n.43 (11th Cir. 
2008) (“We understand Twombly as a further articulation of the standard by which to evaluate the 
sufficiency of all claims brought pursuant to Rule 8(a).” (emphasis supplied)), and Phillips v. 
Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2008) (“[W]e decline at this point to read 
 Additionally, at least one district court has 
Twombly 
so narrowly as to limit its holding on plausibility to the antitrust context.”), with Aktieselskabet 
AF 21. Nov. 2001 v. Fame Jeans Inc., 525 F.3d 8, 15 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (rejecting the district 
court’s interpretation of Twombly “as establishing a new threshold for complaints,” and 
“conclud[ing] that Twombly leaves the long-standing fundamentals of notice pleading intact”), 
and McZeal v. Spring Nextel Corp., 501 F.3d 1354, 1356 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“[There is no 
suggestion] that [Twombly] changed the pleading requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
8 as articulated in Conley.”). 
31  Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1953 (holding that Twombly “expounded the pleading standard for all 
civil actions” (emphasis supplied)). 
32  E.g., Access to Justice Denied: Ashcroft v. Iqbal: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the 
Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 6 
(2009) (testimony of Arthur R. Miller), available at 
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/printers/111th/111-36_53090.PDF) (“I have spent my entire 
life with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and I firmly believe that [Twombly and Iqbal] 
represent a philosophical sea of change in American civil litigation.”); Moore, supra note 4, at 
452 (“[T]o survive a motion to dismiss [after Twombly and Iqbal], plaintiffs must now include 
more detailed allegations that demonstrate a plausible entitlement to relief.”); see also Douglas G. 
Smith, The Twombly Revolution?, 36 Pepp. L. Rev. 1063, 1099 (2009) (“[T]he Rule 8(a) pleading 
standard [i]s the gateway to further proceedings under the generous discovery provisions of the 
Federal Rules.”) 
33  See generally, e.g., Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Changing Shape of Federal Civil 
Pretrial Practice: The Disparate Impact on Civil Rights and Employment Discrimination Cases, 
158 U. Pa. L. Rev. 517, 520 (2010) (“Empirical studies of the effect of Twombly and Iqbal 
suggest that these decisions have resulted in the disproportionate dismissal of civil rights cases.”). 
34  E.g., Bender v. LG Elec. U.S.A., Inc., No. C 09-02114 JF (PVT), 2010 WL 889541, at *6 
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2010) (“Sufficient allegations would include, at a minimum, a brief 
description of what the patent at issue does, and an allegation that certain named and specifically 
identified products or product components also do what the patent does, thereby raising a 
plausible claim that the named products are infringing.”); Eidos Commc’ns, LLC v. Skype Techs. 
SA, 686 F. Supp. 2d 465, 466, 467 (D. Del. 2010) (granting defendants’ motion to dismiss and on 
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held that plaintiffs must specify in the complaint which claims the defendants are alleged 
to have infringed.35 These supplemental criteria, when construed against the canvas of a 
heightened pleading standard, emphasize a high premium on pre-filing investigative work 
to ensure that patent litigation is not commenced without “plausible” facts upon which to 
support the complaint. Therefore, notwithstanding the high costs of discovery and trial 
that are already inherently characteristic of patent litigation,36 the cost of a patent lawsuit 
can become substantial for plaintiffs even before the patent owner ever initiates an action 
in court. Additionally, because many patent owners hinge their decision to litigate a 
patent on the prospect of being awarded enhanced damages due to willful infringement,37 
patentees may decline to file suit on the theory that pleading willful infringement is too 
steep a mountain to climb under the Court’s Twombly–Iqbal framework for pleading.38
B.  The Cost of Litigating Patents 
 
Thus, plaintiffs face significant obstacles and deterrents to asserting their patent rights 
even before commencing formal litigation. 
Even if a patent owner believes he has a watertight case against an alleged 
infringer and is able to proceed beyond the dismissal phase of a lawsuit, there are 
nevertheless numerous reasons that a plaintiff might be better off settling a patent dispute 
and avoiding discovery and a potential trial. Whether directly or indirectly, these several 
reasons boil down to one fundamental, underlying factor—cost. From the perspective of a 
                                                                                                                                                 
the grounds that “[n]o specific products or methodologies [were] named in the complaint” and 
that the plaintiffs failed “to specify, at a minimum, a general class of products or a general 
identification of the alleged infringing methods.”); Ware v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., No. 4:05-
CV-0156-RLV, 2010 WL 767094, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 5, 2010) (“[T]he plaintiffs again failed to 
supply sufficient factual allegations to identify what each individual defendant has done to 
infringe the patent in question. . . . [A] complaint must identify how the defendants have allegedly 
infringed a patent.”). 
35  Taurus IP, LLC v. Ford Motor Co., 539 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1127 (W.D. Wis. 2008), 
remanded, 315 Fed. Appx. 252 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“[A] plaintiff’s failure to specify which claims it 
believes are infringed by a defendant’s products places an undue burden on the defendant, who 
must wade through all the claims in a patent and determine which claims might apply to its 
products to give a complete response.”). 
36  See infra Part II.B.1 (discussing the time and monetary costs of patent litigation). 
37  See infra text accompanying notes 142 and 143 (noting how the possibility of enhanced 
damages incentivizes patent owners to take a case all the way to trial). 
38  See generally Damon C. Andrews, Note, Iqbal-ing Seagate: Plausibility Pleading of 
Willful Patent Infringement, 25 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1955 (2011) (arguing that Twombly–Iqbal 
will make pleading willful infringement virtually impossible when construed against the Federal 
Circuit’s “objective recklessness” framework, see In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 
(Fed. Cir. 2007), cert denied, 552 U.S. 1230 (2008)). 
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defendant facing allegations of patent infringement, “there is simply no cheap and easy 
exit route.”39 However, this sentiment is in no way reserved only for defendants and to 
the exclusion of their plaintiff counterparts. Indeed, the monetary considerations of 
litigating a patent and likelihood of recovery are often enough of a deterrent to patent 
owners to avoid the risks of a lawsuit entirely and to arrive at a resolution without the aid 
of the legal system.40
1.  Monetary Considerations 
 Part II.B.1 reviews just how costly patent litigation is in terms of 
out-of-pocket expenses. Part II.B.2 then evaluates the cost of litigating from the temporal 
aspect of a patent lawsuit. Finally, Part II.B.3 contemplates whether the high costs of 
litigating are worth it for plaintiffs in light of statistical evidence pertaining to their 
likelihood of recovery in patent cases and the corresponding value of the award should 
they prevail. 
It is no secret that patent infringement litigation is expensive. Indeed, scholars and 
commentators have repeatedly referred to the costs associated with patent litigation as 
“exorbitant.” 41 Even as early as 1993, one district court judge hypothesized that the 
parties’ costs in a patent trial combined to exceed $100,000 per day.42 The magnitude of 
attorneys’ fees alone is also exemplified in judicial opinions that shift costs between 
parties in patent cases.43
                                                 
39  Tun-Jen Chiang, The Advantages of Inter Partes Reexamination, 90 J. Pat. & Trademark 
Off. Soc’y 579, 584 (2008). 
 Unfortunately, statistical trends throughout the last decade do 
40  See Kesan & Gallo, supra note 10, at 69 (“The high cost of going to court also 
discourages challenges to incorrectly issued patents. Indeed, it is suggested that many firms may 
be discouraged altogether from using the legal system. In fact, even when the patent is not valid, 
using the courts may be more expensive than both licensing costs and the transaction costs of the 
bargaining required to reach a private agreement.”). 
41  E.g., Jonathan M. Barnett, Property As Access: How Innovation Markets Select 
Innovation Regimes, 119 Yale L.J. 384, 398 (2009); Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Dynamic Federalism 
and Patent Law Reform, 85 Ind. L.J. 449, 455 (2010); Robert M. Seto, A Federal Judges’ View of 
the Most Important Changes in Patent Law in Half-a-Century, 11 J. Tech. L. & Pol’y 141, 147 
(2006). 
42  Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 828 F. Supp. 1208, 1210 (E.D.N.C. 1993), 
aff’d in part, vacated in part, 40 F.3d 1223 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (“It is highly conceivable that the 
cost of this trial for the parties exceeds $100,000 per day, in addition to the time and expense 
associated with this court and the jury.”). 
43  See e.g., Smith Eng’g Co. v. Eisenmann Corp., 28 Fed. Appx. 958, 962 (Fed. Cir. 2002) 
($3.1 million in attorneys’ fees and costs); Owens-Ill., Inc. v. BTL PLC, No. 05 Civ. 2873(LLS), 
2010 WL 2607146, at *5, *12 (S.D.N.Y. June 29, 2010) (awarding $10 million in costs and 
attorneys’ fees for defending infringement claim); Powell v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 715 F. 
Supp. 2d 1285, 1288 (S.D. Fla. 2010) ($2.8 million in attorneys’ fees); Auto. Prods. PLC v. Tilton 
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not indicate a plateau in these costs, and infringement litigation is only becoming 
increasingly expensive. For example, the median cost of litigating a patent where 
between $1 million and $25 million was at risk increased twenty-five percent from 2003 
to 2009.44 This increase was even steeper where the potential recovery was greater than 
$25 million.45 Thus, depending on the size of the plaintiff firm, litigation costs to enforce 
a single patent can constitute a significant part of a company’s budget,46
One proposed solution to combat the expenses of a patent lawsuit is to insure it. 
Under this scheme, potential patent litigants can pay insurance companies to indemnify 
them when involved in patent disputes.
 thus deterring 
that company from asserting its patent rights. 
47  This insurance is generally available to 
companies on both the offensive and defensive sides of a lawsuit,48 and covers, inter alia, 
expenses such as attorneys’ fees and expert witnesses.49
                                                                                                                                                 
Eng’g, Inc., 855 F. Supp. 1101, 1106 (C.D. Cal. 1994), appeal dismissed, 36 F.3d 1109 (Fed. Cir. 
1994) (awarding $1.84 million in attorneys’ fees for patent claim); Howes v. Med. Components, 
Inc., 761 F. Supp. 1193, 1202 (E.D. Pa.1990) ($1.95 million in attorneys’ fees, costs, and 
expenses). 
  For a corporation such as IBM, 
who is a leader in patent applications and consequently often finds itself in related 
44  AIPLA Report 2009, supra note 11, at 29 (reporting an increase from $2 million in 2003 
to $2.5 million in 2009, inclusive of all costs). 
45  Id. (reporting an increase in litigation costs from $3.995 million to $5.5 million between 
2003 and 2009, respectively—a rise of greater than thirty-seven percent). 
46  See Jon E. Wright, Willful Patent Infringement and Enhanced Damages—Evolution and 
Analysis, 10 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 97, 97 (2001) (“[P]atent infringement lawsuits are enormously 
expensive and often swamp balance sheets . . . .” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); 
see also Symposium, supra note 1, at 681 (statement of Judge Saris) (“I have seen statistics 
ranging from a run of the mill case costing $1.2 million to get through [claim construction] to a 
bet-the-company kind of case where lawyers are giving numbers between two and ten million for 
a case budget on a really important patent.”). The expense of litigation cuts both ways and 
likewise places a heavy burden on defendants. See Shashank Upadhye, Understanding 
Willfulness in Patent Infringement: An Analysis of the “Advice of Counsel” Defense, 8 Tex. 
Intell. Prop. L.J. 39, 40 (1999) (“A large damages award can often bankrupt a company.”). 
47  J. Rodrigo Fuentes, Note, Patent Insurance: Toward a More Affordable, Mandatory 
Scheme?, 10 Colum. Sci. & Tech. L. Rev. 267, 268 (2009) (“High litigation costs and ambiguous 
patent rights stimulate demand for patent insurance. Unsurprisingly, insurance companies provide 
coverage for these types of risks.”). 
48  Id. at 269 (“There are two types of patent insurance. Patent litigation insurance, or 
defensive insurance, covers the litigation expenses incurred defending against allegations of 
patent infringement. Patent enforcement insurance, or offensive insurance, reimburses patentees 
for litigation expenses arising from the pursuit of an infringer.”). 
49  Id. at 272–73 (“The money can be used for expenses like attorneys’ fees, expert 
witnesses, raising a defense of invalidity, and reexamination proceedings.”). 
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litigation,50 this insurance may be a good investment to serve as a preventative measure 
for combating the expense of litigation.  However, small firms may not have the capital 
to procure patent litigation insurance. Although the average reported cost of insurance 
according to one company is only $13,000 annually, this premium can exceed $100,000 
per year for plaintiffs depending on the nature of the industry and insured amount.51
2.  Time Considerations 
 
Thus, while sound in theory, only a few, very large and litigious companies may actually 
be able to benefit from the added expense. 
In addition to the bottom-line dollar value of an infringement lawsuit, patent 
litigation is costly with respect to the overall time spent litigating. One third of patent 
cases take more than three years to reach trial from the time the patent owner’s complaint 
was filed, and more than one in every ten patent infringement cases takes longer than five 
years to reach the trial stage. 52  This is due in large part to the complex nature of 
discovery proceedings in patent cases and the proprietary nature of the information at 
issue, which often results in numerous motions to quash discovery requests. 53  Also 
contributing to this protracted timetable is the fact that patent trials are often 
overshadowed by criminal cases that crowd district courts’ dockets.54 Once at trial, patent 
cases can endure for months—and even years.55
The often-unconsidered consequence of a long litigation period or trial is the fact 
that, as a general matter, patents lose value with time. This is evident when analyzed by 
any of several empirical factors.  For instance, Professor Moore determined in a study 
that more than half of all patentees allowed their patents to expire for failure to pay 
 
                                                 
50  See Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 17, at 46 (“Since 1994, IBM has amassed over 
25,000 U.S. patents, far more than any other company, each year ranking first on the USPTO’s 
list of top patent earners.”); see also Robert C. Bird, Pathways of Legal Strategy, 14 Stan. J.L. 
Bus. & Fin. 1, 32 (2008) (“Litigating to halt infringement is important for any firm, and IBM has 
done so regularly.”). 
51  Fuentes, supra note 46, at 282. 
52  Moore, supra note 4, at 461 (citations omitted). 
53  Id.; see Daniel A. Crane, Exit Payments in Settlements of Patent Infringement Lawsuits: 
Antitrust Rules and Economic Implications, 54 Fla. L. Rev. 747, 757–58 (2002) (“Under the 
liberal rules of discovery, competitors in litigation may request one another's most sensitive trade 
secrets, including marketing studies, pricing information, and customer lists.”). 
54  See supra notes 8–9 and accompanying text. 
55  Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Does Geographic Choice Affect 
Innovation?, 79 N.C. L. Rev. 889, 908 (2001) (average length of 1.12 years for patent trials filed 
in district courts from 1995 to 1999). 
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maintenance fees before their allotted statutory monopoly period had run.56 Likewise, 
additional data reveals that the longer a patent stays out of litigation, the less valuable it 
tends to be.57 The result of this is that litigation may be for nothing, thus discouraging 
patentees from asserting their rights.58 To illustrate this concept, consider that a patent 
that introduces a novel invention in a niche field of technology may catch on quickly and 
enjoy instantaneous and enormous success in the marketplace.  Realizing this market, 
peer firms may immediately invest substantial resources to introduce competing products 
in the marketplace based on the original “breakthrough” patent. By using the 
breakthrough patent’s written description as a guideline and further modifying the 
original firm’s successful patent, competitors are able to “design around” the firm’s 
rights.59
3.  The Litigation “Lottery” 
 Moreover, by allowing consumers to determine what improvements could be 
made to the first patent, competitors may actually gain an advantage by not being the first 
to introduce a product since they can then free-ride on the research-and-development 
investments of the original firm to produce a better product.  
Coupled with the fact that patent litigation is very costly is the idea that litigation 
yields unpredictable results. Indeed, several prominent scholars have stated that litigation 
can result in “debilitating uncertainty” for patent owners.60
                                                 
56  Kimberly A. Moore, Worthless Patents, 20 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1521, 1526 (2005). 
 This is due in part to the 
requisite level of technical knowledge required to understand the inherent complexities of 
57  Allison et al., supra note 15, at 460 (“[I]t is rare for a patent to become valuable and be 
litigated late in its life.”) 
58  Ted Sichelman & Stuart J.H. Graham, Patenting by Entrepreneurs: An Empirical Study, 
17 Mich. Telecomm. Tech. L. Rev. 111, 134–35 (2010) (“It has been said that patents can be a 
‘gigantic waste of time and money.’ Some innovators—particularly in some technology fields—
believe that patents can be easily “designed around,” a notion that can lead companies to regard 
patenting as a worthless activity. This view maintains that if the claims of the patent are 
sufficiently narrow, a third party can escape infringement by making simple changes to the 
underlying invention while achieving the same functionality.” (citation omitted)). 
59  This is a particular concern depending on the industry. See, e.g., Maxwell R. Morgan, 
Regulation of Innovation under Follow-On Biologics Legislation: FDA Exclusivity as an Efficient 
Incentive Mechanism, 11 Colum. Sci. & Tech. L. Rev. 93, 104 (2010) (“[T]he biotechnology 
industry organization has expressed concern that patent protection is narrower for biologics 
products than for pharmaceuticals and that, as a result, generic manufacturers will be able to 
easily design around biologics product patents to avoid infringement liability should biologics 
innovators attempt to litigate.”). 
60  Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark Janis & Mark A. Lemley, Anticompetitive Settlement of 
Intellectual Property Disputes, 87 Minn. L. Rev. 1719, 1723 (2003). 
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a patent’s subject matter, as well as the patent document itself.61 Moreover, the fact that 
courts must apply what appear as enigmatic legal doctrines to the underlying technologies 
further muddies the waters with respect to predictability in patent litigation. This one–two 
combination of science and law has led several commentators to question district court 
judges’ abilities to adjudicate patent infringement cases.62 However, much to their credit, 
it may be that district court judges are in fact “the lesser of two evils” when it comes to 
patent trials.63 Professor Leslie has commented that “[t]he only thing more fear-inspiring 
to the infringement defendant than a bench trial is a jury trial.”64 Therefore, whether 
adjudicated by a judge or jury, patent infringement trials have produced a litigation 
“lottery”65
The lottery ticket of a patent lawsuit at the trial court level can be scratched away 
in two layers: determining liability and awarding relief. With respect to the first layer, 
patent owners roll the dice as to whether the adjudicator will find that the defendant 
infringed the asserted claims. This gamble is less risky when plaintiffs try patent cases 
before a jury as opposed to a judge.
 wherein the plaintiff purchases a ticket that increases in cost over time in hope 
of a handsome reward based on slightly favorable odds. 
66
                                                 
61  See S. Jay Plager, 2001 U. Ill. L. Rev. 69, 72 (“Because claims in U.S. patents are written 
using words and phrases that purport to be in the English language, it might help if the rest of 
English language practice was used: short declarative sentences, careful and precise phrasing, and 
so on.” (emphasis supplied)). 
 In fact, several scholars have commented that juries 
62  See e.g., David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect? An Empirical Study of Claim 
Construction Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 223 (2007) (finding that district 
court judges do not improve their ability to construe patent claims with increased experience); see 
also Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 993 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Mayer, C.J.) 
(“[T]here is simply no reason to believe that judges are any more qualified than juries to resolve 
the complex technical issues often present in patent cases.”). 
63  See Moore, supra note 5, at 3–4. 
64  Christopher R. Leslie, The Anticompetitive Effect of Unenforced Invalid Patents, 91 
Minn. L. Rev. 101, 135 (2006); see Fisher, supra note 6, at 55 (“The Seventh Amendment right to 
have a jury is meaningless if the jury lacks the ability to make a non-arbitrary decision.”). 
65  Edmund L. Andrews, A ‘White Knight’ Draws Cries of ‘Patent Blackmail’, N.Y. Times, 
Jan. 14, 1990, § 3, at 5 (calling a patent case tried before a jury “a ‘judicial lottery,’ an often 
unpredictable system that can yield huge rewards for those who are sufficiently aggressive”); 
Richard B. Schmitt, Juries’ Role in Patent Cases Reconsidered, Wall St. J., Feb. 18, 1994, at B6 
(stating that allowing juries to decide the outcomes of patent cases has created “a system of 
justice that is basically a lottery”). 
66  Moore, supra note 6, at 386 tbl.2 (reporting a 68% win rate for patentee–plaintiffs in 
cases adjudicated by juries and a 51% in cases adjudicated by district court judges). 
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“tend to love” and even “idealize” inventors. 67 However, others have noted that jury 
decisions in patent cases are often marked by “unpredictability, irrationality, and 
unreliability.”68 Whatever bias might exist may be related more to which party initiated 
the lawsuit as opposed to the “good guy–bad guy” mentality of plaintiffs and 
defendants.69
The second layer of the lottery pertains to remedies. When considering the 
uncertainty that accompanies this aspect of a patent lawsuit, the identity of the parties can 
play a significant role in the award of damages. For instance, juries tend to disfavor large 
companies.
 Therefore, despite the legal and economical obstacles facing plaintiffs when 
commencing an infringement action, it may be advantageous in the long run for the party 
claiming infringement to initiate the proceedings involving a patent as opposed to being a 
counterclaimant.  
70  Thus, the jury that is comprised of unemployed workers or blue-collar 
citizens may be reluctant to compel a local or regional small-to-midsize firm to pay a 
large national corporation tens of millions of dollars notwithstanding returning a verdict 
that the plaintiff’s patent was infringed. Moreover, the jury comprised of laypersons may 
opine that an award of $2 million, for example, is sufficient to compensate a plaintiff for 
a defendant’s patent infringement. However, this amount may be only a small percentage 
of what the plaintiff views as the patent’s true value and the real economic injury 
suffered. Jurors’ inability to comprehend patents and the corresponding value derived 
from them often leads to underestimating reasonable royalty rates for calculating 
damages awards.71
                                                 
67  See id. at 372 (stating that juries “appear to love inventors”); Jonathon Taylor Reavill, 
Tipping the Balance: Hilton Davis and the Shape of Equity in the Doctrine of Equivalents, 38 
Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 319, 366 (1996) (stating that juries “tend to idealize inventors”).  
 While these same principles can no doubt favor the prevailing patent 
owner as plaintiff in an infringement action, plaintiffs must nevertheless always take into 
68  Paul R. Michel & Michelle Rhyu, Improving Patent Jury Trials, 6 Fed. Cir. B.J. 89, 105 
(1996). 
69  Moore, supra note 6, at 368 (finding that patentees prevailed in only 38% of cases tried 
before juries when a potential infringer initiated a declaratory judgment action as opposed to 
being called into court as a defendant). 
70  See TXO Prods. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 433, 490-91 (1993) (O’Connor, 
J., dissenting) (“Courts long have recognized that juries may view large corporations with great 
disfavor. . . . Corporations are mere abstractions and, as such, are unlikely to be viewed with 
much sympathy.”). 
71  See Einer Elhauge, Do Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking Lead to Systematically 
Excessive Royalties?, 4 J. Competition L. & Econ. 535, 556–576 (2008) (“[T]he juries that award 
patent damages have far from perfect knowledge and perfect accuracy. . . . Hindsight bias may 
cause juries to underestimate [value] because patented inventions often seem more obvious after 
they have been created. Underestimations may also exceed overestimations if patent owners have 
information about the value of their patents that they either cannot communicate to courts or must 
bear large costs to communicate to courts.”). 
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account the pool of potential adjudicators when deciding whether to file suit, or 
alternatively, at what stage of the litigation lottery to consider settlement negotiations. 
C.  Litigation Harms 
Under the Priest–Klein framework for modeling the probability of settlement in 
civil litigation, the stakes for each party to a lawsuit are symmetrical,72 i.e., “the plaintiff 
stands to gain exactly what the defendant stands to lose.”73 However, patent infringement 
lawsuits deviate from this formulation and are thus considered asymmetrical insofar as 
“the patent holder has a much greater stake in the outcome of the litigation than does the 
alleged infringer.”74 This difference is attributable to the fact that litigation can reduce—
and even entirely destroy—the scope of a plaintiff’s patent rights by rendering some or 
all of the asserted patent claims invalid or unenforceable.75 This is particularly damaging 
since patents are by their very nature a right to exclude the general public from making, 
using, or selling an invention, and therefore, a finding of invalidity or unenforceability 
adversely affects a patentee’s rights as against all competitors in a given technology 
market, not only the opposing party to the lawsuit.76
                                                 
72  George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. Legal 
Stud. 1, 24 (1984). 
 Parts II.C.1 and II.C.2 detail two 
ways that patent litigation can leave patentee–plaintiffs in an objectively worse position 
73  Kimberly A. Moore, Xenophobia in American Courts, 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1497, 1547 
n.171 (2003). 
74  Moore, supra note 6, at 377. The pendulum of asymmetry can likewise swing toward the 
defendant’s potential for incurring a greater loss in litigation. See, e.g., Peter J. Hammer & 
William M. Sage, Antitrust, Healthcare Quality, and the Courts, 102 Colum. L. Rev. 545, 599 
(2002) (“Defendants often have more to lose in antitrust litigation than the plaintiffs stand to gain, 
a fact that violates one of the basic assumptions of the Priest–Klein model.”); see also Colleen V. 
Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The Complex Patent Ecosystem and Its Implications for 
the Patent System, 62 Hastings L.J. 297, 318 (2010) (stating that unlike defendants, “patentees are 
not burdened by the need to manage investor expectations or minimize disruption to the 
company’s core business”). 
75  See Vivek Koppikar, Using ADR Effectively in Patent Infringement Suits, 89 J. Pat. & 
Trademark Off. Soc’y 158, 159–60 (2007) (“[I]f a defendant successfully pleads the defense of 
patent invalidity it can be fatal to a plaintiff since they will not only have lost the lawsuit at hand 
but also their patent rights to the invention.”). 
76  Moore, supra note 6, at 377; see also Joseph S. Miller, Building a Better Bounty: 
Litigation-Stage Rewards for Defeating Patents, 19 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 667, 668, 688 (2004) (“A 
patent challenger who succeeds in defeating a patent wins spoils that it must share with the world, 
including all its competitors. . . . A court judgment that a patent claim is invalid is a public 
good.”). 
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than a court’s mere finding of noninfringement, thus making patent holders even more 
risk-averse and further discouraging them from asserting their exclusionary rights.77
1.  Invalidity 
 
Among the defenses to an infringement allegation that are provided in the Patent 
Act is the statutory shield of invalidity. 78 A defendant has two options by which to 
attempt to invalidate patent claims: inter partes reexamination or trial. 79 Inter partes 
reexamination occurs at the PTO and is similar to an ex parte reexamination procedure, 
the major difference being that during inter partes reexamination the third-party 
requester, i.e., the defendant seeking to invalidate the patent, is permitted to reply and 
counter the plaintiff–patent owner’s arguments for sustained validity.80 While statistics 
demonstrate that defendants are utilizing inter partes reexamination with increasing 
frequency, 81  the primary method of invalidating patent claims remains to be a 
determination by a judge or jury. 82 When a defendant elects this avenue to attack a 
patent’s validity, the factfinder weighs in on whether the contested claims are invalid for 
failure to satisfy any number of the various statutory requirements of patentability.83
                                                 
77  Moore, supra note 6, at 377 (“Because the patent holder stands to lose more than the 
defendant, the patent holder will be more risk-averse to trial.”). 
 
78  35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006). 
79  See Roger Shang & Yar Chaikovsky, Inter Partes Reexamination of Patents: An 
Empirical Evaluation, 15 Tex. Intell. Prop. L.J. 1, 2 (2006) (“The inter partes reexamination 
procedure was created by Congress in 1999 as a litigation alternative to challenge a patent’s 
validity.”). 
80  See Roger Shang, Inter Partes Reexamination and Improving Patent Quality, 7 Nw. J. 
Tech. & Intell. Prop. 185, 188–191 (2009); see also USPTO Rules of Practice in Patent Cases, 37 
C.F.R. §§ 1.947, 1.951(b) (2010). 
81  Performance and Accountability Report: Fiscal Year 2010, at 137 tbl.13B, U.S. Patent & 
Trademark Office, available at http://www.uspto.gov/about/stratplan/ar/2010/USPTOFY 
2010PAR.pdf (reporting a 612% increase in the number of inter partes reexamination requests 
known to have related litigation from 2006 to 2010). 
82  Cf. Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d 1343, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2001) 
(“[Validity] is a matter for resolution at trial.”). 
83  See Structural Rubber Prods. Co. v. Park Rubber Co., 749 F.2d 707, 720 (Fed. Cir. 1984) 
(“[W]e have held that a trial court may, with proper instructions, present a patent case to a jury 
for a general verdict encompassing all of the issues of validity and infringement . . . .”); Jeanne C. 
Fromer, Patentography, 85 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1444, 1469 (2010) (“[N]umerous issues in patent 
cases are considered factual, including the ultimate question of patent infringement and many 
issues related to a patent’s validity—principally an invention’s utility and novelty.”). 
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When compared with trial, challenging a patent’s validity utilizing the inter partes 
reexamination procedure yields numerous advantages for defendants. For instance, inter 
partes reexamination is significantly less expensive than trial.84 Thus, the plaintiff who 
tries to push the cost-conscious defendant into settlement in the early stages of a lawsuit 
may find that the defendant is more willing to stick around to fight the patent than if a 
judge or jury determination were the only route to invalidity. Moreover, the cost-saving 
benefits for defendants of inter partes reexamination can be magnified if the outcome of 
the proceeding is able to stay copending discovery in a subsequent trial.85 Additionally, 
unlike at trial—where patentees enjoy a statutory presumption of validity and defendants 
bear the burden of proving a patent invalid based on clear and convincing evidence86—
there is no presumption of validity when a patent is scrutinized during inter partes 
reexamination.87 Furthermore, the “lottery” that occurs when litigants ask judges and 
juries to construe claim language to determine validity does not present as great a risk for 
defendants during reexamination since PTO examiners are better versed in the 
technological field of a patent’s subject matter.88
                                                 
84  Compare AIPLA Report 2009, supra note 11, at 29 (reporting a median total cost of $2.5 
million for a patent infringement lawsuit in 2009 where between $1 million and $25 million was 
at stake), with AIPLA Report 2009, supra note 11, at 30 (reporting a median cost of $188,000 for 
inter partes reexamination through an appeal to the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences in 
2009). 
 
85  35 U.S.C. § 318 (2006); see Paul Morgan & Bruce Stoner, Reexamination Versus 
Litigation—Making Intelligent Decisions in Challenging Patent Validity, 86 J. Pat. & Trademark 
Off. Soc’y 441, 454–55 (2004). 
86  35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006) (“A patent shall be presumed valid. . . . The burden of 
establishing invalidity of a patent or any claim thereof shall rest on the party asserting such 
invalidity.”); Titan Tire Corp. v. Case New Holland, Inc., 566 F.3d 1372, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2009) 
(“[A]n alleged infringer who raises invalidity as an affirmative defense has the ultimate burden of 
persuasion to prove invalidity by clear and convincing evidence . . . .”).  This standard is currently 
being challenged in the Supreme Court in Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 647 
(2010) (granting certiorari to determine the proper standard of for sustaining a patent’s validity 
under 35 U.S.C. § 282). 
87  35 U.S.C. § 314 (2006) (“[R]eexamination shall be conducted according to the 
procedures established for initial examination . . . .”); In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852, 856 (Fed. Cir. 
1985) (Markey, C.J.) (“[T]he presumption is operative to govern procedure in litigation involving 
validity of an issued patent. A statute setting rules of procedure and assigning burdens to litigants 
in a court trial does not automatically become applicable to proceedings before the PTO.”). 
88  Chiang, supra note 38, at 582–83 (“While the quality of the examiner corps has been 
subject to much criticism, there seems little doubt that PTO examiners are better qualified to 
evaluate the technical disclosures of prior art references than lay jurors and district court 
judges.”).  
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However, there are disadvantages to inter partes reexamination for defendants 
that benefit patentees. The greatest downside is the estoppel effect.89  Pursuant to 35 
U.S.C. § 315(c), a third-party requester is estopped from asserting at a later time “the 
invalidity of any claim finally determined to be valid and patentable on any ground which 
the third-party requester raised or could have raised during the inter partes reexamination 
proceedings.”90 Although defendants can assert new prior art not considered during the 
reexamination at a later trial,91 the general sentiment is that defendants get only one bite 
at the invalidity apple.92 Additionally, there is no opportunity for defendants to cross-
examine and depose inventors during inter partes reexamination, and consequently they 
must rely solely on written documents to invalidate a patent.93 Notwithstanding these and 
other drawbacks,94
To understand more clearly the harm of invalidity, one need only look to the 
pharmaceutical industry and the practice of reverse payments. In a reverse-payment 
scenario, brand-name pharmaceutical companies compensate their generic counterparts to 
settle patent challenges and delay market entry for patented drugs.
 it is fair to say that two methods for invalidating patent claims are 
better than one, and by giving defendants a choice of forum and adjudicator based on the 
circumstances of a particular case, plaintiffs ultimately face a greater risk of their patents 
being invalidated. 
95  These reverse-
payment agreements—which can reach well into the tens of millions of dollars96—have 
been heavily scrutinized in the context of antitrust violations, 97
                                                 
89  Id. at 583. 
 though the principal 
90  35 U.S.C. § 315(c) (2006). 
91  Id. 
92  See Chiang, supra note 38, at 580 (“[A]ccused infringers should realize that inter partes 
reexamination is effectively a substitute for a jury trial. Litigation estoppel means that inter partes 
reexamination will become (in almost all cases) the only chance of contesting validity.”). 
93  Morgan & Stoner, supra note 84, at 455. 
94  For a more comprehensive list of drawbacks to inter partes reexamination, see id. at 454–
56. 
95  Henry N. Butler & Jeffrey Paul Jarosch, Policy Reversal on Reverse Payments: Why 
Courts Should Not Allow the New DOJ Position on Reverse-Payment Settlements on 
Pharmaceutical Patent Litigation, 96 Iowa L. Rev. 57, 60 (2010). 
96  See, e.g., Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1300 (11th Cir. 2003), 
cert denied, 543 U.S. 939 (2004) (payment plan from brand-name company to generic company 
of $3 million up front, $3 million after three months, and $6 million every three months thereafter 
for roughly two years). 
97  Compare In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 
2008), cert denied, 129 S. Ct. 2828 (2009) (declining to find that brand-name and generic 
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reason underlying the brand-name patent holders’ willingness for paying to quell the 
competition rather than asserting their patent rights in litigation is fear of their patents 
being found invalid.98
2.  Inequitable Conduct 
 If a court invalidates what a brand-name company perceives to be 
a valuable patent, the floodgates of competition would open for all generic 
pharmaceutical companies to freely manufacture and sell similar drugs. 
Another harm that can befall plaintiffs who assert their patent rights in litigation is 
a finding of inequitable conduct that consequently renders the patent unenforceable. For a 
defendant to prevail under this theory, the defendant must “provide[] evidence of 
‘affirmative misrepresentations of a material fact, failure to disclose material information, 
or submission of false material information, coupled with an intent to deceive’” by the 
plaintiff during prosecution of the patent.99 If the court finds that the plaintiff violated his 
duty of “candor, good faith, and honesty” before the PTO, the patent will be rendered 
unenforceable.100
Although the end result may be the same as a simple finding of invalidity, i.e., 
judgment for the defendant, a court’s determination that a patent is unenforceable due to 
inequitable conduct can have a greater damning effect on the patent as a whole. This is 
because a finding of inequitable conduct renders the entire patent unenforceable, 




                                                                                                                                                 
companies violated the Sherman Act by entering into settlement agreement); Schering-Plough 
Corp. v. F.T.C., 402 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 548 U.S. 919 (2006) (same), with 
In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 939 
(2004) (holding that reverse payments are per se unlawful). See generally Christopher M. 
Holman, Do Reverse Payment Settlements Violates the Antitrust Laws?, 23 Santa Clara Computer 
& High Tech. L.J. 489 (2007) (assessing the legality of reverse-payment patent settlements). 
 On the other hand, a simple finding of invalidity pertains to only those 
claims asserted against a defendant, and thus a patentee is able to retain the presumption 
98  Hovenkamp et al., supra note 59, at 1761–62 (“What the pharmaceutical patentees who 
agree to exclusion payments seek is . . . a guaranteed insulation from competition, without the 
risk that the patent is held invalid.”); see In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 
210 (2006), cert denied, 551 U.S. 1144 (2007) (“[L]arge reverse payments indicate a patent 
holder’s lack of confidence in its patent’s strength or breadth . . . .”). 
99  Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Boehringer Ingelheim GMBH, 237 F.3d 1359, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 
2001) (quoting Baxter Int’l, Inc. v. McGaw, Inc., 149 F.3d 1321, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
100  Honeywell Int’l Inc. v. Universal Avionics Sys. Corp., 488 F.3d 982, 999 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
101  Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister, Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 877 (Fed. Cir. 1988) 
(“When a court has finally determined that inequitable conduct occurred in relation to one or 
more claims during prosecution of the patent application, the entire patent is rendered 
unenforceable.” (emphasis supplied)). 
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of validity for all claims not determined to be invalid.102 Even worse for patentees, a 
court’s finding of inequitable conduct as to one patent can have a ripple effect by 
rendering the corresponding family of related patents unenforceable.103 Moreover, courts 
often award defendants attorney’s fees when a plaintiff is found to have obtained the 
patent fraudulently,104
III. RELIEF FOR PATENTEES 
 thus adding to the list of harms for plaintiffs that can result from 
litigating. 
The Patent Act provides two types remedies for prevailing patent owners in 
infringement lawsuits: injunctive relief105 and damages.106 Because these remedies form 
the basis of a plaintiff’s incentive to initiate litigation (or at least his formally stated 
motivation in a complaint), 107
                                                 
102  Christopher A. Cotropia, Modernizing Patent Law’s Inequitable Conduct Doctrine, 24 
Berkeley Tech. L.J. 723, 764 (2009) (“Invalidity affects only those asserted patent claims. If a 
patentee does not want to risk the value in a particular claim, she simply does not assert it. 
Inequitable conduct, in contrast, causes the assertion of a single patent claim to expose the whole 
patent, and potentially all related patents, to a finding of unenforceability.”). 
 it is appropriate to evaluate the role that each relief 
mechanism plays in a patent owner’s subsequent decision to pursue an infringement 
claim all the way through to the trial stage of a lawsuit. Parts III.A and III.B detail 
injunctive and damages awards, respectively, with regard to the likelihood that a patent 
owner will obtain either remedy, as well as the magnitude of each remedy in terms of 
their dollar values. Part III.C then analyzes settlement agreements between plaintiffs and 
potential infringers as a third form of relief. 
103  See Consol. Aluminum Corp. v. Foseco Int’l Ltd., 910 F.2d 804, 809 (Fed. Cir. 1990) 
(finding a substantial relationship between patents and concluding that inequitable conduct as to 
one patent significantly affected others). 
104  35 U.S.C. § 285 (2006) (“The court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney 
fees to the prevailing party.”); see, e.g., Brasseler, U.S.A. I, L.P. v. Stryker Sales Corp., 267 F.3d 
1370, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“Exceptional cases are normally those involving bad faith litigation 
or those involving inequitable conduct by the patentee in procuring the patent.”). 
105  35 U.S.C. § 283 (2006). 
106  Id. § 284. 
107  For example, Form 18 of the Federal Rules  of Civil Procedure (Complaint for Patent 
Infringement) sets forth the plaintiff’s demands as “a preliminary and final injunction against the 
continuing infringement” and “an accounting for damages. Fed. R. Civ. P. form 18. But see infra 
Part V.A (arguing that neither damages nor injunctions are the real reason that patent owners 
engage in litigation). 
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A.  Injunctive Relief 
One underlying premise of this Article is that given the sharply decreasing value 
of many patents with respect to time (particularly in the electronic arts, where innovation 
occurs seemingly overnight), an injunction may be of little or no value to a plaintiff 
whose patented technology is long outdated at the conclusion of a lengthy trial. 108
1.  The Pre-eBay Golden Years 
 
Nevertheless, one would be remiss not to assess the availability of equitable relief to 
patent owners who, based on the nature or field of their inventions, would indeed benefit 
from injunctions. Part III.A.1 chronicles the state of equitable relief for patent owners 
during the years leading up to the Supreme Court’s decision in eBay Inc. v. 
MercExchange, L.L.C. Part III.A.2 then provides an analysis of the opinion itself and the 
resulting rule of law. Finally, Part III.A.3 evaluates the current state of equitable relief 
and the role that potential injunctions plays in patentees’ motivation to litigate. 
For over two decades before the Supreme Court’s 2006 decision in eBay Inc. v. 
MercExchange, L.L.C.,109 the Federal Circuit presumptively granted equitable relief in 
patent cases.110 This framework allowed patentees to enjoy exclusivity in their inventions 
merely as a matter of course upon a finding of actual infringement. 111
                                                 
108  See supra Part II.B.2 (discussing competitors’ abilities to invent around a product and the 
shelf life of a patented product in the marketplace). 
 For instance, 
during the ten-year span from 1983 to 1993, district courts granted injunctive relief to 
109  547 U.S. 388 (2006) 
110  E.g., Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1247 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“It is the 
general rule that an injunction will issue when infringement has been adjudged, absent a sound 
reason for denying it.”); Smith Int’l Inc. v. Hughes Tool Co., 718 F.2d 1573, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 
1983) (“Once the patentee’s patents have been held to be valid and infringed, he should be 
entitled to the full enjoyment and protection of his patent rights. . . . A court should not be 
reluctant to use its equity powers once a party has so clearly established his patent rights.”). 
111  See, e.g., Vincenzo Denicolò et al., Revisiting Injunctive Relief: Interpreting eBay in 
High-Tech Industries with Non-Practicing Patent Holders, 4 J. Competition L. & Econ. 571, 572 
(2008) (“Before 2006, many observers felt that lower courts faced with patent infringement cases 
frequently granted injunctions as a matter of course to those who sought them.”); Andrei Iancu & 
W. Joss Nichols, Balance the Four Factors in Permanent Injunction Decisions: A Review of Post-
eBay Case Law, 89 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc’y 395, 395 (2007) (“In the past, the Federal 
Circuit has noted a ‘general rule’ that permanent injunctions are appropriate after a finding of 
infringement. Permanent injunctions were granted almost as a matter of course to a prevailing 
patentee.” (footnoted omitted)). 
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patent owners in greater than sixty-one percent of cases.112 Because of the very nature of 
an injunction, courts’ preference for granting equitable relief amounted to a great deal of 
leverage for plaintiffs when negotiating licensing agreements and one-time settlement 
payments with alleged infringers.113 For example, when facing a permanent injunction 
from the continued manufacture and sale of its Blackberry® device, 114  defendant 
Research in Motion, Ltd. paid plaintiff NTP a one-time sum of more than $612 million 
for licensing rights to the technology.115 To that end, whether or not a patent owner 
actually saw an infringement case through all the way to trial, it is fair to say that 
injunctions were extremely valuable, even for their bullying power alone.116
2.  eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C. 
 
In 2006, the Supreme Court examined what the Justices themselves viewed as a 
presumptive grant of injunctive relief to patent owners by the Federal Circuit in the 
landmark case eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.117 eBay involved a business method 
patent owned by MercExchange for an electronic marketplace designed to foster 
commercial transactions between private individuals through a common trusted entity.118 
Upon finding that eBay infringed the asserted patents, the district court awarded 
MercExchange damages, but denied its request for a permanent injunction. 119
                                                 
112  M.A. Cunningham, Preliminary Injunctive Relief in Patent Litigation, 35 IDEA 213, 231 
(1995). 
 The 
113  See Lily Lim & Sara E. Craven, 25 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech. L.J. 787, 792 
(2009) (“The pre-eBay threat of a near automatic injunction gave a patentee a very powerful 
bargaining chip in licensing and settlement negotiations.”). 
114  NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
115  Tom Krazi & Anne Broache, Blackberry Saved, CNET News (Mar. 3, 2006), 
http://news.cnet.com/BlackBerry-saved/2100-1047_3-6045880.html. 
116  See Mark A. Lemley, Should Property or Liability Rules Govern Information?, 85 Tex. 
L. Rev. 783, 798 (2007) (“The threat that a patent holder will obtain an injunction that will force 
the downstream producer to pull its product from the market can be very powerful. These threats 
can greatly affect licensing negotiations, especially in cases where the injunction is based on a 
patent covering one small component of a complex product.”). 
117  See eBay, 547 U.S. at 395 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (“[F]rom at least the early 19th 
Century, courts have granted injunctive relief upon a finding of infringement in the vast majority 
of patent cases.”); id. at 396 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“To the extent earlier cases establish a 
pattern of granting an injunction against patent infringers almost as a matter of course, this pattern 
simply illustrates the result of the four-factor test in the contexts then prevalent.”). 
118  Id. at 390 (majority opinion). 
119  MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 275 F. Supp. 2d 695 (E.D. Va. 2003). 
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Federal Circuit reversed, applying its “general rule” that “a permanent injunction will 
issue once infringement and validity have been adjudged.”120 The Supreme Court then 
reversed the Federal Circuit, holding that prevailing patent owners must satisfy a four-
factor test before a court can grant injunctive relief.121  Writing for a unanimous Court, 
Justice Thomas distinguished between the statutory right conferred by a patent and the 
remedies that are available once it is proven that the right is infringed.122
In a concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy commented on the significant change in 
the “economic function” of patents over time.
  
123 He stated that firms have shifted from a 
regime in which patents were used “as a basis for producing and selling goods” to one in 
which patents are primarily “bargaining tool[s] [used] to charge exorbitant fees to 
companies that seek to buy licenses to practice the patent.”124 This language has formed 
much of the foundation for the widespread sentiment that injunctive relief would be more 
difficult to obtain after eBay.125
3.  The Current State of Equitable Relief 
   
Much ink was spilled in legal scholarship after the Supreme Court’s eBay 
decision with regard to the future direction of injunctive relief in various types of 
intellectual property cases. 126
                                                 
120  MercExhange, L.L.C. v. eBay, 401 F.3d 1323, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 However, the loquaciousness of many commentators 
concerning the perceived increase in the difficulty of obtaining injunctions post-eBay 
turned out to largely unwarranted once empirical data became available. For example, 
121  eBay, 547 U.S. at 391. 
122  Id. at 392 (“[T]he creation of a right is distinct from the provision of remedies for 
violations of that right.”). 
123  Id. at 396 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
124  Id. 
125  E.g., Nina Medlock et al., The Non-Practicing Patentee’s Right to a Permanent 
Injunction Restraining Patent Infringement: Going Once, Going Twice, Gone?, 18 NO. 9 Intell. 
Prop. & Tech. L.J. 1, 2–3 (2006) (“Justice Kennedy appears to take a more restrictive view of a 
patentee’s right to an injunction.”); Jaideep Venkatesan, Compulsory Licensing of Nonpracticing 
Patentees after eBay v. MercExchange, 14 Va. J.L. & Tech. 26, 32 (2009) (“Justice Kennedy’s 
concurrence struck a far different tone, focusing in particular on why nonpracticing patentees 
should be refused injunctions.”). 
126  E.g., David H. Berstein & Andrew Gilden, No Trolls Barred: Trademark Injunctions 
after eBay, 99 Trademark Rep. 1037 (2009) (applying eBay to injunctions in trademark cases); 
Michael W. Carroll, Patent Injunctions and the Problem of Uniformity Cost, 13 Mich. Telecomm. 
Tech. L. Rev. 421 (2007) (patent cases); Jetti Gibson, Almost Quiet on the Copyright Front: 
eBay’s False Alarm, 14 Rich. J.L. & Tech. 6 (2007) (copyright cases). 
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early reports revealed that in the first three years since eBay, district courts granted 
injunctions in seventy-six percent of cases127—a far cry from the drop-off feared by 
many patentees. In fact, the most current data available shows that this plateau has 
continued for nearly five years since the Supreme Court decision, as district courts have 
awarded permanent injunctions in more than seventy-five percent of the 164 patent cases 
since eBay.128
However, while there has not been a substantial change in the overall frequency 
that district courts have granted permanent injunctions after eBay, there has been a 
marked development in the criteria upon which courts grant equitable relief. For instance, 
several district courts have interpreted the irreparable-injury factor set forth in eBay to 
largely pertain to whether the parties in the lawsuit are in direct competition with each 
other.
  
129 In the overwhelming majority of cases in which the factfinder found that the 
parties directly compete, injunctions issued.130 Likewise, where courts determined that 
there was no direct competition, plaintiffs were generally denied injunctions. 131 
Additionally, courts have hinged the grant or denial of an injunction on whether a party is 
a patent “troll.” 132
                                                 
127  Stacy Streur, The eBay Effect: Tougher Standards but Courts Return to the Prior 
Practice of Granting Injunctions for Patent Infringement, 8 Nw. J. Tech. & Intell. Prop. 67, 67 
(2009) (finding that permanent injunctions were granted in fifty-two of sixty-eight cases). 
 Of the relatively small sample of district court cases denying 
128  Post-eBay Permanent Injunction Rulings by District Courts to 1-16-2011, PatStats.org 
(Jan. 30, 2011), http:// www.patstats.org/Patstats2.html (reporting that 124 of 164 district court 
cases have granted permanent injunctions). 
129  E.g., TruePosition Inc. v. Andrew Corp., 568 F. Supp. 2d 500, 531 (D. Del. 2008) 
(“Courts awarding permanent injunctions typically do so under circumstances where plaintiff 
practices its invention and is a direct market competitor.”). It is worth noting also that “direct 
competition” has been interpreted broadly. See Commonwealth Sci. & Indus. Research Org. v. 
Buffalo Tech., Inc., 492 F. Supp. 600, 604 (E.D. Tex. 2007) (“While [plaintiff] does not compete 
with [defendant] for marketshare, [plaintiff] does compete internationally with other research 
groups—such as universities—for resources, ideas, and the best scientific minds to transform 
those ideas into realities.”). 
130  Douglas Ellis et al., The Economic Implications (and Uncertainties) of Obtaining 
Permanent Injunctive Relief after eBay v. MercExchange, 17 Fed. Cir. B.J. 437, 442–43 (2008) 
(noting that injunctions granted in twenty-four of twenty-six cases in which the parties were 
found to compete directly, and in the two cases where no injunction issued, the courts refused on 
other grounds). 
131  Id. at 443–44 (finding that injunctions were denied in five of nine cases in which the 
parties were found to not compete directly). 
132  The counterpart “villain” to a practicing patentee is a patent troll. See John M. Golden, 
“Patent Trolls” and Patent Remedies, 85 Tex. L. Rev. 2111, 2112 (2007) (defining “patent troll” 
as “one of a class of patent owners who do not provide end products or services themselves, but 
who do demand royalties [on their patents] as a price for authorizing the work of others”). 
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injunctions after eBay, several have hinged on the fact that the plaintiff was a non-
practicing entity. 133
B.  Monetary Damages 
 Based on these emerging criteria, plaintiffs should consider 
numerous specific factors surrounding their own patent use and their relationship to 
potential defendants when deciding whether to file suit if their incentive for litigating is 
to obtain equitable relief. 
 The second available remedy for patentees under the Patent Act is a damages 
award. The first benchmark courts look to for assessing monetary harm resulting from a 
defendant’s infringement is a measure of actual damages (e.g., lost profits or an 
established royalty rate).134 However, when actual damages cannot be determined, patent 
owners who prevail in infringement lawsuits are entitled to a floor of damages that 
corresponds with a reasonable royalty were they to license the technology to the 
defendant.135 While in theory this is a practical method for approximating harm, actually 
determining such a value has long troubled courts and has been the subject of much legal 
scholarship.136 For instance, Judge Learned Hand once famously wrote that “[t]he whole 
notion of a reasonable royalty is a device in aid of justice, by which that which is really 
incalculable shall be approximated . . . .” 137  Over the years, courts have developed 
several factors to help guide this hypothesis, 138
                                                 
133  See, e.g., z4 Techs. v. Microsoft Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 437, 440 (E.D. Tex. 2006). 
 and the general formulation that has 
134  Trell v. Marlee Elecs. Corp., 912 F.2d 1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
135  35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006) (“Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award the 
claimant damages adequate to compensate for the infringement but in no event less than a 
reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer, together with interest and 
costs as fixed by the court.”); Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 
2009) (“A reasonable royalty is, of course, merely the floor below which damages shall not fall.”) 
(citation omitted) (internal quotationn marks omitted); Hanson v. Alpine Valley Ski Area, Inc., 
718 F.2d 1075, 1078 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (“If actual damages cannot be ascertained, then a 
reasonable royalty must be determined.”). 
136  E.g., Fromson v. W. Litho Plate & Supply Co., 858 F.2d 1568, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1988) 
(Markey, C.J.) (“Determining a fair and reasonable royalty is often . . . a difficult judicial chore, 
seeming often to involve more the talents of a conjurer than those of a judge.”); see generally 
Mark A. Lemley, Distinguishing Lost Profits from Reasonable Royalties, 51 Wm. & Mary L. 
Rev. 655, 674 (2009) (discussing the “systematic distortions in the reasonable royalty structure” 
due to blurring with lost profits). 
137  Cincinnati Car Co. v. N.Y. Rapid Transit Corp., 66 F.2d 592, 595 (2d Cir. 1933). 
138  See Ga.-Pac. Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), 
cited with approval, Micro Chem., Inc. v. Lextron, Inc., 317 F.3d 1387, 1393 (Fed. Cir. 2003) 
(setting forth a non-exhaustive list of fifteen factors for determining a reasonable royalty); see 
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emerged is that a reasonable royalty is the amount that the alleged infringer would be 
able to contract with the plaintiff for the right to make, use, or sell the patented invention 
in the relevant market while still making a reasonable profit.139
Taken alone, proven or assessed damages can be substantial. One need only to 
canvas a small sampling of patent opinions to understand the magnitude of the stakes 
involved.
  
140 For instance, as early as the mid-1990s, juries were already awarding patent 
owners damages amounts in the billions.141 Additionally, courts’ flexibility and leniency 
with regard to the “realities of the marketplace” has led reasonable royalty damages to 
increase in excess of the amount for which parties would normally be found to 
negotiate. 142  Moreover, notwithstanding the fact that compensatory damages by 
themselves can be highly rewarding for prevailing patentees, the real prize to be won 
from an infringement lawsuit is a court’s determination that the defendant infringed the 
plaintiff’s patent willfully. Under the willful infringement doctrine, courts can increase 
monetary damages up to three times the amount awarded as a punitive measure for a 
defendant’s bad-faith infringement.143
                                                                                                                                                 
also ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc., 594 F.3d 860, 869 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“[A] reasonable 
royalty analysis requires a court to hypothesize, not to speculate.”). 
 With compensatory damages routinely spiking into 
139  Wang Labs., Inc. v. Toshiba Corp., 993 F.2d 858, 870 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (citation omitted) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  
140  See, e.g., i4i P’ship Ltd. v. Microsoft, Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 857 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (holding 
that a jury award of $200 million is not clearly excessive); Laser Dynamics, Inc. v. Quanta 
Computer, Inc., 2010 WL 2574059, *1 (E.D. Tex. June 22, 2010) (finding a reasonable royalty 
award of $52 million); Mobil Oil. Corp. v. Amoco Chem. Corp., 915 F. Supp. 1333, 1374 (D. Del. 
1994) (allowing a $48 million award). 
141  See, e.g., Litton Sys., Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 87 F.3d 1559, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996) 
(recounting jury award of $1.2 billion to plaintiff), vacated, 520 U.S. 1111 (1997); see also 
Robert A. Armitage, Commentary, Now That the Courts Have Beaten Congress to the Punch, 
Why Is Congress Still Punching the Patent System?, 106 Mich. L. Rev. First Impressions 43, 48 
(2007) (discussing a $1.53 billion verdict for Microsoft in Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, 
Inc., though that amount was later set aside). 
142  See Brian C. Love, The Misuse of Reasonable Royalty Damages as a Patent Infringement 
Deterrent, 74 Mo. L. Rev. 909, 920 (2009) (“[A]n ongoing trend in patent law [is] nudging the 
reasonable royalty formulation further and further away from the traditional willing licensor–
willing licensee negotiation and, therefore, [away] from representing the market value of the 
patented invention.”); see also Eric E. Bensen & Danielle M. White, Using Apportionment to 
Rein in the Georgia-Pacific Factors, 9 Colum. Sci. & Tech. L. Rev. 1, 40 (2009) (“Modern 
decisional law does not restrict reasonable royalties to some portion of the economic value 
actually provided by the patent and, in fact, provides almost no concrete guidance to the fact-
finder in determining a reasonable royalty. The result is that reasonable royalty awards are at best 
arbitrary and at worst punitive. This is not what patent law traditionally provides.”). 
143  See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006) (“[T]he court may increase the damages up to three times the 
amount found or assessed.”); see also In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 
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the hundreds of millions of dollars, it is no wonder that nearly every claim of patent 
infringement includes an allegation that the defendant infringed the patent willfully.144
C.  Settlement Agreements 
 
Thus, depending on the strength of a patent owner’s case for infringement—as well as his 
resources to endure years of litigating and to see the lawsuit all the way through to the 
trial stage—seven-, eight-, nine-, or even ten-figure judgment amounts certainly provide a 
strong incentive to assert one’s patent rights. 
Despite the fact that the Patent Act includes only damages awards and injunctions 
in its remedies provisions, I have also categorized and included settlement agreements in 
this Part of the Article as a patent “remedy” for three reasons.145 First, because such a 
small percentage of patent cases ever reach the trial stage, 146  the available data on 
damages awards may be not be representative of the monetary value at stake in patent 
infringement suits on the whole. Second, of those cases that do go to trial, patent owners 
prevail only fifty-eight percent of the time,147
This Article has previously discussed reverse-settlement payments in the context 
of the pharmaceutical industry;
 thus further narrowing the available data 
for assessing monetary relief. Lastly, whether a defendant is found liable for infringement 
in court, or alternatively, settles and pays a one-time sum or licensing fees to the plaintiff, 
the result is the same—transfer of capital to the party asserting his patent rights. 
148
                                                                                                                                                 
2007), cert denied, 552 U.S. 1230 (2008), (discussing the relationship between a court’s decision 
to award enhanced damages and the nature of a defendant’s infringement). 
 however, this subpart refers to traditional settlement 
agreements, wherein defendants compensate plaintiffs to avoid a finding of liability at a 
144  See Kimberly A. Moore, Empirical Statistics on Willful Patent Infringement, 14 Fed. Cir. 
B.J. 227, 232 (2004) (finding that between 1999 and 2000, plaintiffs pled willfulness in 92.3% of 
patent-infringement cases); see also Wright, supra note 45, at 97 (“A charge of willful 
infringement has become a routine adjunct to almost every pleading asserting patent 
infringement.”). 
145  Cf. Christopher R. Leslie, Patents of Damocles, 83 Ind. L.J. 133, 155 (2008) (“Licensing 
activity does not currently qualify as enforcement for Walker Process purposes. Courts have held 
that a patentee’s ‘cautioning possible infringers and offering licenses, does not constitute a charge 
of infringement.’” (quoting Am. Needle & Novelty Co. v. Schuessler Knitting Mills, Inc., 379 
F.2d 376, 378 (7th Cir. 1967))). 
146  See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
147  See Moore, supra note 6, at 385. This percentage includes those cases tried to both judges 
and juries.  
148  See supra notes 94–97 and accompanying text. 
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trial.149 This exchange of capital between parties generally takes either of two forms. In 
one scenario, defendants pay plaintiffs a one-time lump sum to settle all past 
infringement, but without the option to continue use of the plaintiff’s patented invention 
in the future. These agreements are referred to as retroactive. 150  Alternatively, in a 
forward-looking arrangement, defendants compensate a plaintiff through a series of 
scheduled payments, wherein the plaintiff licenses its patented technology to the 
defendant for use alongside its own product. 151  Even within the forward-looking 
framework for settlement agreements, there are several variations on how a licensing 
arrangement between a plaintiff and defendant appear.152
Like court-awarded damages, settlement values can provide a strong incentive for 
patentees to litigate (and as this Article contends, are the most likely reason underlying a 
plaintiff’s decision to litigate). For example, settlement values to plaintiffs can rise well 
in to the tens of millions of dollars when patent owners license their technologies to only 
a single entity.
 
153 These fees are capable of exceeding the billion-dollar mark when 
evaluated in the context of a company’s entire IP portfolio.154
                                                 
149  See Michael J. Chapman, Using Settlement Licenses in Reasonable Royalty 
Determinations, 49 IDEA 313, 315–16 (2009) (“The key consideration in determining whether an 
agreement qualifies as a settlement license is whether the terms of the agreement are influenced 
by the belief that, absent the agreement, the dispute is likely to be argued before (and potentially 
resolved by) a third party such as a court or an arbitration panel.”). 
 Because of the nature of 
several high-tech industries—most notably software, computers, and semiconductors—
licensing often occurs between competitors. This can be beneficial to patentees by giving 
them access to a competitor’s portfolio of complementary patents, thus enabling them to 
150  See id. at 316 (“Retroactive settlement licenses grant the alleged infringer authorization 
for its past use of the patent-at-issue in exchange for compensation to the patent holder. Under 
such licenses, the licensee does not receive permission to use the patent in the future and is 
expected to cease its infringing activity after the agreement is executed.”). 
151  Id. (“[I]n a forward-looking settlement license, the parties agree to terms that permit the 
alleged infringer to continue using the patent-at-issue in exchange for compensation to the patent 
holder.”). 
152  See Hovenkamp et al., supra note 59, at 1721 (“Settlements of IP disputes often take the 
form of unrestricted or restricted licenses, which may or may not be exclusive; cross-licensing 
arrangements; pools; agreements not to license third parties or to license only jointly; or market 
division or field-of-use agreements.”). 
153  See, e.g., Stuart J.H. Graham & Ted Sichelman, Why Do Start-Ups Patent?, 23 Berkeley 
Tech. L.J. 1063, 1076–77 (2008) (discussing Microsoft’s licensing payments to IBM that are 
estimated to be in the range of $20–30 million).  
154  Id. at 1075–76 & n.49 (noting how IBM generates over $1 billion in annual revenue from 
licensing agreements). 
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enter a previously monopolized market.155 Under this scheme, parties enter into a mutual 
agreement to cross-license, or “pool,” their patent rights, thus affording one another 
access to many technologies that they would otherwise be precluded from using. 156  
Moreover, notwithstanding the narrow scope of many patents, patent owners can extract 
considerable value from their rights without the harm of increased competition by 
licensing their patents to entities with whom they do not compete, or at least not 
directly. 157
However, there is a significant disadvantage to settlement agreements that is not 
inherent in either damages awards or injunctions. This drawback pertains to potential 
violations by settling parties under the antitrust laws. While this Article does not 
endeavor to explore, or even scratch the surface, of the plethora of scholarship and case 
law on the antitrust implications of patent settlement agreements,
 Thus, whether through licensing fees or the access and ability to infringe 
others’ patents without the risk of liability, the many forms that settlement agreements 
can take are a powerful incentive for patentees to litigate. 
158
                                                 
155  See John H. Barton, Antitrust Treatment Oligopolies with Mutually Blocking Patent 
Portfolios, 69 Antitrust L.J. 851, 871–72 (2002) (“[I]t is impossible for either firm to enter the 
market without infringing the other's intellectual property; the cross-license [of complementary 
technologies] therefore makes it possible for both firms to enter the market.”). 
 it is at least worth 
mentioning here that there are serious harms that can befall on plaintiffs and defendants 
entering into such arrangements.  
156  For an explanation of patent pools, see Roger B. Andewelt, 53 Antitrust L.J. 611, 611–14 
(1985) (“The essence of a patent pool . . . is this mutual agreement among patent owners to waive 
their respective exclusive patent rights.”); Phillip W. Goter, Note, Princo, Patent Pools, and the 
Risk of Foreclosure: A Framework for Assessing Misuse, 96 Iowa L. Rev. 699, 712–13 (2011) 
(“Patent pools . . . involve a bundle of patents ‘pooled’ together through cross-licenses by distinct 
firms, usually for the purposes of research and development or sublicensing for 
commercialization.”). 
157  See Robert P. Merges, Commercial Success and Patent Standards: Economic 
Perspectives on Innovation, 76 Calif. L. Rev. 803, 869–70 (1988) (“[F]irms which license 
technology do not necessarily sell into the same markets as the licensee. At least one empirical 
study undercuts the assumption that direct competitors frequently engage in licensing. . . . The 
reason is obvious: Firms are reluctant to enable their direct competitors to compete because they 
fear an immediate threat to their competitive position would result.”). 
158  See generally Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark D. Janis, Mark A. Lemley & Christopher R. 
Leslie, IP and Antitrust: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles Applied to Intellectual Property Law 
(2d ed. 2010) (analyzing firms’ exercise of intellectual property rights in light of the antitrust 
laws); Christopher R. Leslie, Antitrust Law and Intellectual Property Rights: Cases and Materials 
(2010) (same). For a sampling of cases where courts have considered the legality of patent 
settlement agreements in the context of the antitrust laws, see supra note 96. 
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IV.  ENFORCING YOUR RIGHTS: WHY WE LITIGATE 
The previous Parts of this Article have explored the disincentives of patent 
litigation,159 the statutory remedies conferred by the Patent Act,160 and the time–value of 
patents respective of how long it may take a court to reach a decision on the merits as to 
infringement. 161  It is no coincidence that each of these aforementioned discussions 
intersects the others en route to the same underlying conclusion: patentees want to avoid 
trial and settle infringement-related disputes outside the courtroom. However, as Part 
IV.A details below, unlike most other areas of law, where court filings are the result of 
parties’ failure to reach an earlier agreement,162
A.  Litigation as a Way of Life 
 patent litigation is more akin to a way of 
doing business—a means to an end rather than an end in and of itself. Part IV.B then 
reviews several proposals for institutional change in the patent system to reflect the 
unique nature of infringement litigation. 
While plaintiffs might initially file patent infringement lawsuits under the guise of 
seeking one of the two available statutory remedies available in court, it may very well be 
that these patent owners have no intention of ever seeing a case through to trial to collect 
these rewards; statistics strongly support this hypothesis. 163  In Part III.A above, I 
discussed how the perceived value of an injunction is derived from its ability to foster 
settlement negotiations.164
                                                 
159  See supra Part II (discussing the pleading problem, expense of litigating, and potential 
harms to plaintiffs associated with litigating). 
 However, in Part III.C, I subsequently classified settlement 
160  See supra Part III.A and III.B (reviewing injunctive relief and monetary relief pursuant to 
35 U.S.C. §§ 283, 284). 
161  See supra Part II.B.3 (applying several criteria to demonstrate the general assertion that 
patents value rapidly with time after issuance). 
162  See, e.g., John Lande, Principles for Policymaking about Collaborative Law and Other 
ADR Processes, 22 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 619, 660 (2007) (“Litigation and court 
adjudication can certainly create or exacerbate problems for disputants—especially in family 
cases—and should normally be used as a last resort.”). 
163  Lemley, supra note 4, at 1501 (“The overwhelming majority of [patent] lawsuits settle or 
are abandoned before trial.”).  
164  See supra notes 112–115, 123 and accompanying text; see also MedImmune, Inc. v. 
Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 122 (2007) (“If respondents were to prevail in a patent 
infringement action, petitioner could be ordered to pay treble damages and attorney’s fees, and 
could be enjoined from selling Synagis, a product that has accounted for more than 80 percent of 
its revenue from sales since 1999. Unwilling to risk such serious consequences, petitioner paid 
the demanded royalties . . . .”) 
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agreements themselves as a separate form of relief for plaintiffs since they often involve 
the exchange of cash or other calculable assets between parties. This amphibious nature 
of settlement agreements forms the backbone of this Article’s underlying thesis: because 
settlements provide patentees some hybrid variation of both monetary relief and 
injunctive relief, and because plaintiffs are able to obtain either or both of these benefits 
without subjecting their patents to the harms associated with trial, patentees litigate for 
the bounties associated with out-of-court settlement. As an tangential corollary to this 
assertion, it is also reasonable to infer that patentees are concerned primarily with 
improving their own economic circumstances, even if this means engaging in behavior to 
the shared benefit of another firm; 165  else, patent owners would stay the course for 
injunctions with greater resolve. At first glance, this framework for litigation seems 
wholly unremarkable and commonplace in light of the widespread commentary on 
settlement schemes as an alternative to costly and prolonged trial.166 And admittedly so, 
patent litigation looks like any of several other areas of law in both form and result (e.g., 
party P and party D are unable to resolve a dispute; party P sues party D; party P and 
party D settle the dispute at a value that maximizes their own interests).167
First, the vast majority of patent owners are large corporations who manage 
robust patent portfolios, not individual inventors.
 However, a 
closer examination of several factors unique to patent litigation reveals that patent owners 
should be able to make the litigate-to-settle determination ex ante as opposed to ex post 
with respect to the filing of a lawsuit, and that in fact, litigation is a way of life for patent 
owners. 
168  This is due in large part to the 
expense of patent procurement,169
                                                 
165  See Chapman, supra note 148, at 330 (“[A] patent holder’s decision to grant a settlement 
license, or any other license, involves a cost-benefit analysis in which one expects the patent 
holder to seek maximum compensation in exchange for permission to practice the patent.”); see 
also supra notes 154, 155 and accompanying text (discussing licensing agreements between firms 
for complementary technologies). 
 which could arguably be deemed the first step in a 
166  See Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting to No: A Study of Settlement 
Negotiations and the Selection of Cases for Trial, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 319, 320 (1991) (“With some 
notable exceptions, lawyers, judges, and commentators agree that pretrial settlement is almost 
always cheaper, faster, and better than trial. Much of our civil procedure is justified by the desire 
to promote settlement and avoid trial.”); see also supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
167  Hovenkamp et al., supra note 59, at 1722 (“[T]he parties to an IP dispute have a strong 
incentive to enter into agreements that maximize their own interests . . . . [T]he uncertain scope 
and validity of IP rights may encourage a collusive settlement, serving both to remove the 
uncertainty and to permit the two firms to share monopoly profits.”) 
168  John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Who’s Patenting What? An Empirical Exploration of 
Patent Prosecution, 53 Vand. L. Rev. 2099, 2117 (2000) (finding that in a sample of 1000 
randomly selected patents from a two-year period of study, over seventy percent were assigned to 
what the PTO classifies as “large entities”). 
169  See supra notes 17 and 18 and accompanying text. 
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plaintiff’s lawsuit, however attenuated. The result of this patent-holding structure is that 
plaintiffs are frequently repeat-litigants in infringement lawsuits, often asserting the same 
patent or related patents from the same family.170 As an expected consequence of this 
repetition, plaintiffs obtain a sense of familiarity with the litigation,171
Second, the fact that patent litigation can be insured on both the offensive and 
defensive ends of a lawsuit indicates that companies are now beginning to include 
litigation among the “myriad [of] risks”
 and settlement 
negotiations involving patent licensing become a second-nature operation for a company 
just like any other routine business practice. The frequency of inter partes negotiations 
with potential infringers thus translates into increased efficiency within a company. By 
realizing this efficiency, firms are able to maximize the value of their patents through 
licensing arrangements without paying for the cost of trying each patent individually.  
172  that are commonplace in a business’s 
everyday operations. This is especially true in the case of start-up companies, which often 
lack capital, resources, and tangible assets, and which rely on licensing fees derived from 
litigation settlements as a primary source of revenue. In fact, patent infringement 
litigation has become so intertwined in a part of firms’ routine operations that it has been 
called a “daily fact of life for most corporate legal departments”173 and “the business 
model of the new millennium.”174
Finally, one of the greatest indicators that patent litigation is simply a way of life 
for firms is embodied in a simple question: why else obtain a patent? One widely held 




                                                 
170  Allison et al., supra note 15, at 467 (“Litigated patents also tended to be part of ‘families’ 
of issued patents.”). 
 However, for well-established companies, this same reasoning does not 
necessarily apply, thus continuing to beg the question. The answer lies in litigation. 
Based on the current framework for increasing damages in patent cases, companies are 
discouraged from carefully reading patents and seeking an outside opinion, but rather are 
incentivized to simply engage in what could be infringing behavior to avoid a court’s 
171  See supra note 167  
172  Fuentes, supra note 46, at 267. 
173  Ranganath Sudarshan, Nuisance-Value Patent Suits: An Economic Model and Proposal, 
25 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech. L.J. 159, 160 (2008). 
174  Mark A. Lemley, Ten Things to Do About Patent Holdup of Standards (and One Not to 
Do), 48 B.C. L. Rev. 149, 155 (2007). 
175  Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 625, 653 (2002) (“Among venture 
capitalists, both the quantity and quality of patents have long been factors that are taken into 
consideration when deciding whether to invest in a company, particularly in its early stages.”); 
see Sichelman & Graham, supra note 57, at 122 (“[A]lthough patents may have no intrinsic value 
for the company that owns them, they can provide an extrinsic value to outsiders estimating the 
company’s worth.”). 
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later finding that they infringed the patent willfully.176
B.  Changing the Landscape 
 Thus, if patents no longer serve a 
preventative role to put competitors on notice of one’s rights, their purpose is largely 
reduced to an enforcement role that is used to drive settlement agreements. 
To address the concerns previously raised in this Article surrounding the inherent 
drawbacks of patent litigation,177
1.  Reform at the PTO 
 several commentators have suggested ways to improve 
the patent system from both an administrative standpoint and from a legal standpoint. 
Collectively, this inventory of proposals covers the gamut of patent litigation from the 
patent prosecution process all the way through a lawsuit to an infringement trial. While I 
certainly do not hold these proposals out as my own, I do attempt to frame them in a way 
that underscores the objective of settlement in patent litigation. The following subparts 
detail three such proposals and how they can reduce the cost and harms of litigating while 
increasing efficiency and predictability. 
Even as early as a decade ago, there were nearly 400,000 patent applications 
pending before the PTO.178 This number has undoubtedly only increased as the number 
of patent applications has exploded over the past ten years.179  Because of this backlog, 
and due to limited human capital to evaluate the applications, patent examiners are 
encouraged to spend a finite amount of time per application.180
                                                 
176  See Note, The Disclosure Function of the Patent System (Or Lack Thereof), 118 Harv. L. 
Rev. 2007, 2019–2020 (2005) (“[W]enever innovators read a patent, they lay the groundwork for 
a later finding of willful infringement. Consequently, innovators must weigh the cost of either an 
opinion letter or the increased risk of enhanced damages against the potential benefits from 
reading patents. Faced with this calculation, many innovators have ceased using patents as a 
research tool; they either use them only to search for potential infringement problems, or simply 
avoid reading them altogether.”). 
 This practice results in the 
issuance of a relatively large percentage of patents that are later found to be invalid under 
177  See supra notes 1–15 and accompanying text. 
178  Nancy J. Linck et al., A New Patent Examination System for the New Millennium, 35 
Hous. L. Rev. 305, 307 (1998) (citation omitted). 
179  See Cotropia, supra note 101, at 750 & n.38 (“The number of patent applications is rising 
exponentially each year while, at the same time, the USPTO faces a significant examiner attrition 
rate.”). 
180  See Warren K. Mabey, Jr., Deconstructing the Patent Application Backlog . . . A Story of 
Prolonged Pendency, PCT Pandemonium & Patent Pending Pirates, 92 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. 
Soc’y 208, 241–42 (2010). 




The solution to complex and unpredictable patent litigation may be to attack the 
problem on the front end. Professor Lemley and others have suggested shifting to a 
registration-based system for patents akin to that of copyrights, and allowing courts to 
determine validity later.
 Knowing this, defendants may be more willing to fight a 
patent in court or through inter partes reexamination procedures, thus encouraging 
expensive litigation.  
182
2.  Alternative Dispute Resolution 
 This would effectively eliminate the backlog of applications 
pending examination on the merits. And while this would seemingly exacerbate the 
problem of litigating patents by encouraging more challenges by defendants, tailoring 
such a scheme towards a settlement structure could actually prove to be a useful remedy 
to the current system of litigation. For example, in keeping the inter partes examination 
procedures intact, a registration system would allow examiners to spend more time 
scrutinizing patents that are the subject of litigation, thus providing the parties involved 
with a better idea of how a court might later rule as to validity. In other words, 
eliminating the current initial examination procedures, but instituting a much more 
rigorous inter partes reexamination framework, may sway parties to settle a dispute 
based on examiners’ findings rather than pursue a trial. Such a system also confers a 
significant benefit on the PTO itself by relieving its financial strain since the number of 
requests for reexamination is but a tiny fraction of the number of applications received.  
While the above proposal pertains to an ex ante method for remedying the current 
state of patent litigation, this subpart interjects a proposal right into the middle of the 
litigation process itself—alternative dispute resolution (ADR). Generally speaking, ADR 
can take the form of a mediation or arbitration.183 In a nonbinding mediation, an impartial 
third party conducts joint and separate meetings with the plaintiff and defendant to 
encourage a mutual agreement between them.184
                                                 
181  Moore, supra note 6, at 392 (finding judges to invalidate patents in 36% of cases and 
juries in 29% of cases). 
 In arbitration, parties subject themselves 
to a type of “private judging” in which a neutral third party determines the outcome of the 
182  Lemley, supra note 14, at 1526 (“[N]ot only shouldn’t we increase the time spent in 
prosecution, but we should also reduce or eliminate examination entirely, and rely on the 
litigation process to sort the good patents from the bad.”); see also F. Scott Kieff, The Case for 
Registering Patents and the Law and Economics of Present Patent-Obtaining Rules, 45 B.C. L. 
Rev. 55, 70–74 (2003). 
183  See David A. Fitzgerald II, Saving Alternative Dispute Resolution in Patent Law: 
Countering the Effects of the Patent Troll Revolution, 23 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 345, 353–58 
(2008). Although negotiation is typically a third arm of alternative dispute resolution trio, I have 
chosen to not include negotiation in this analysis. 
184  See Bruce B. Brunda, Resolution of Patent Disputes by Non-Litigation Procedures, 15 
AIPLA Q.J. 73, 77–79 (1987). 
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dispute.185 And unlike mediation, a resolution reached through arbitration can be binding 
on parties.186
While both of these are very sound in theory, there are some reasons to think that 
they might be unsuccessful. First, although ADR can help abate, and even eliminate, the 
cost of a patent trial by reducing the issues to be litigated, its overall financial benefits to 
parties are debatable, at least in the context of arbitration.
  
187 Moreover, while seemingly 
counterintuitive (especially given this Article’s criticism of patent trials), the lack of 
predictability in patent trials that can result in extremely large damage awards for patent 
owners is not present in ADR; 188  thus, plaintiffs might not be willing to subject 
themselves to procedures where the windfall factor for damages based on the litigation 
lottery is not available. Notwithstanding these and other hurdles, the growing expense 
and complexity of litigation is driving parties to use ADR as a method of settling patent 
disputes without the use of judges and juries. And as sign that ADR is in fact succeeding, 
Kevin Casey estimates that between sixty and seventy percent of patent cases settle 
through mediation procedures that would not otherwise.189
3.  Specialized Trial Courts 
 
One late-stage solution to remedying the unpredictability in patent litigation is for 
Congress to establish specialty trial courts just as it has directed all patent appeals to the 
Court of the Appeals for the Federal Circuit. There is no shortage of discussion on this 
idea among academics,190
                                                 
185  Fitzgerald, supra note 182, at 354–55. 
 and indeed, practitioners have likewise called for specialized 
186  35 U.S.C. § 294(a) (2006). 
187  See Brunda, supra note 183, at 82 (“Cost savings associated with arbitration are widely 
assumed but uncertain. Savings resulting from reduced attorney time, hearings and fewer 
witnesses are offset by arbitrator’s fees. Moreover, the applicable costs are accelerated to the 
point that they may be more burdensome than the delayed costs of conventional litigation. 
Consequently any presumed cost advantage must be closely reviewed.”); see also William F. 
Heinze, Patent Mediation: The Forgotten Alternative in Dispute Resolution, 18 AIPLA Q.J. 333, 
342 (1991). 
188  See supra notes 65 and 66 and accompany text. 
189  Casey, supra note 9, at 11–12 (“Mediation is especially effective, in contrast to binding 
arbitration or court trials, in cases involving three to five parties each with different positions. 
Mediation is now commonly used to settle large, complex intellectual property disputes.”). 
190  See, e.g., Donna M. Gitter,  Should the United Sates Designate Specialist Patent Trial 
Judges? An Empirical Analysis of H.R. 628 in Light of the English Experience and the Work of 
Professor Moore, 10 Colum. Sci. & Tech. L. Rev. 169 (2009); Holderman & Guren, supra note 
8, at 18–20; LeRoy L. Kondo, Untangling the Tangled Web: Federal Court Reform Through 
Specialization for Internet Law and Other High Technology Areas, 2002 UCLA J.L. & Tech. 1; 
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patent courts.191 The justification for this proposal is the same as that driving the creation 
of the Federal Circuit: predictability and uniformity.192 Congress recently passed a law to 
“establish a pilot program in certain United States district courts to encourage 
enhancement of expertise in patent cases among district judges.” 193  Under this law 
(which has a scheduled trial period of roughly ten years194), Congress aims to reduce the 
Federal Circuit’s high reversal rate of district court decisions pertaining to patent law, 
thus resulting in more predictability for litigants at the trial level.195
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
This Article has provided a comprehensive review of the perils that await 
plaintiffs to patent litigation in terms of expense, time consumption, and potential harms. 
It has also examined patentees’ incentives to litigate infringement disputes based on 
available remedies and the likelihood of receiving them in a court of law depending the 
identity of the arbiter. In particular, this Article illuminated settlement and licensing 
agreements as the real underlying reason that parties to a patent dispute involve 
themselves in litigation.  In doing so, this Article concluded that litigation-for-settlement 
is not a destination at which patent owners arrive, but rather a means of doing business in 
light of the fact that it can be insured and, for many emerging companies, is the primary 
source of revenue. Based on this analysis, although unassuming, the answer to the 
question “why do patentees litigate?” is, simply, because it’s what they do. 
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